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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Karen Jenkins and eleven other former employees (collectively, the “Employees”) 
of The Amalgamated Life Insurance Company (“ALICO” or “Amalgamated Life”) 
appeal a grant of summary judgment to ALICO by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on their claims for violations of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 et seq.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. Background 
 A. Facts  
 1. ALICO Hires the Employees 
Prior to May 9, 2004, the Employees worked in the claims department of The 
Union Labor Life Insurance Company, Inc. (“ULLICO”) at a facility in King of Prussia, 
Pennsylvania, known as the Pennsylvania Service Center (“PSC”).  While employed by 
ULLICO, the Employees were members of the Office and Professional Employees 
International Union (the “OPEIU”), Local 153, and the terms and conditions of their 
employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement.  As employees of 
ULLICO, they were participants in a defined benefit pension plan.   
On March 9, 2004, ULLICO entered into agreements pursuant to which it would 
outsource its claims administration services to ALICO beginning on May 10, 2004.  
Under those agreements, PSC employees would have the opportunity to work for 
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ALICO.  The agreements did not, however, require ALICO to maintain their pension 
benefits, nor did they provide for the transfer to ALICO of any part of ULLICO‟s defined 
benefit pension plan.  On March 11, 2004, ULLICO provided the PSC employees with 
letters informing them about the transition of their employment to ALICO.  Those letters 
told them that ALICO‟s “offer of employment likely will include permanent changes in 
the salary, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment that you have 
experienced with ULLICO.”  (App. at 537.)   
The following week, ALICO distributed a document to the PSC employees 
containing “Questions and Answers for [ULLICO] Staff about Amalgamated Life” (the 
“Q&A”).  (App. at 129.)  The Q&A responded to the question “[i]s there a Pension 
Plan?” by stating that “[t]here is a 3-year eligibility period for PSC employees to join the 
Amalgamated Life staff pension plan.  Once you become eligible, the 3-year wait period 
will be credited towards the 5-year vesting requirement.”  (App. at 130.)  At around the 
same time, ALICO distributed to the PSC employees a document providing a general 
overview of certain employment benefits (the “General Overview”).  The General 
Overview refers to a 401(k) savings plan but does not mention a defined benefit pension 
plan.       
ALICO extended offers of employment to each of the Employees in letters dated 
April 7, 2004, that provided that, if they accepted, they would become ALICO employees 
on May 10, 2004.  With respect to benefits, the letters reminded them that they had 
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“received a General Overview” giving “a quick summary of our benefit programs.”  
(App. at 8 (italics in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  None of the 
Employees asked about participation in a defined benefit pension plan when they 
received their offers of employment.  All of the Employees accepted those offers,  
ULLICO terminated them on May 9, 2004, and they became ALICO employees on May 
10, 2004.  
 2. The Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Days earlier, on May 7, 2004, ALICO and the Industrial, Technical and 
Professional Employees Union (the “ITPEU”), a union affiliated with OPEIU, signed a 
memorandum of understanding, stipulating that the ITPEU would be the exclusive 
representative for the PSC employees for the purpose of negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement.  The ITPEU subsequently raised the possibility of the new ALICO 
employees participating in a defined benefit pension plan, but ALICO said that it could 
not afford to provide those benefits to them.  In December 2004, ALICO and the ITPEU 
signed an agreement (the “2004 CBA”) that would govern the terms of the PSC 
employees‟ employment until December 31, 2006.  The 2004 CBA did not contain any 
provision that entitled the PSC employees to participate in ALICO‟s defined benefit 
pension plan, although it did provide that they could participate in a 401(k) savings plan.  
Each of the Employees received a copy of the 2004 CBA.  
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In March 2007, ALICO and the ITPEU entered into a second agreement (the 
“2007 CBA”) that would govern the conditions of the PSC employees‟ employment from 
January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2009.  During the negotiation of the 2007 CBA, 
the ITPEU again raised the possibility of the PSC employees‟ participation in a defined 
benefit pension plan, but ALICO again rejected that request, and the union settled for 
increased wages and enhanced severance benefits.  As with the 2004 CBA, each of the 
Employees received the 2007 CBA and could note that it did not provide for participation 
in a defined benefit pension plan.       
In 2009, ALICO and the ITPEU began negotiating a third agreement.  In April 
2010, after ITPEU members had already rejected one proposed agreement, ALICO 
proposed two alternatives, both of which provided that PSC employees would become 
participants in a defined benefit pension plan.  Under one alternative, employees who met 
the plan‟s vesting requirements would accrue benefits beginning in June 2009, and under 
the other, they would receive higher cash compensation but would accrue benefits only 
after January 2011.  The PSC employees voted to accept the second proposal, and, on 
May 4, 2010, ALICO and the ITPEU entered into a memorandum of understanding that 
fixed the terms of their continuing employment (the “2010 MOU”). 
 3. ALICO Terminates the Employees 
In 2007, ULLICO decided not to renew its administrative service agreements with 
ALICO, but it agreed to a more limited arrangement that reduced the volume of claims 
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processed at the PSC.  At that time, ALICO considered closing the PSC and moving 
ULLICO‟s remaining claims processing work to one of its other offices, but decided not 
to.  However, the lease on the PSC facility was due to expire in February 2011, and, in 
April 2010, ALICO began to consider closing it.  Over the next several months, ALICO 
reviewed a number of options for the PSC, ultimately deciding to consolidate it with 
another of the company‟s operations.  On October 8, 2010, ALICO informed PSC 
employees that it was closing the facility, and their employment was terminated on 
October 29, 2010.   
B.    Procedural History 
Following their termination, the Employees filed an eight-count complaint against 
ULLICO, ALICO, the OPEIU, and the ITPEU, alleging that they had been improperly 
denied benefits under ALICO‟s defined benefit pension plan.  The complaint stated 
claims for violations of ERISA, seeking relief based on theories of unjust enrichment and 
equitable estoppel, and for violations of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
151 et seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.     
Following discovery, each of the four defendants moved for summary judgment as 
to the claims against it.  In response, the Employees stipulated to the dismissal of all 
claims against ULLICO, the OPEIU, and the ITPEU. The District Court granted 
ALICO‟s motion to dismiss some of the claims against it, leaving only the ERISA claims.  
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On October 24, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to ALICO on those 
claims as well.   
The Employees filed this timely appeal. 
II. Discussion
1
 
 The Employees have appealed only the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment to ALICO on their equitable estoppel claim.  ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides that 
“a beneficiary may „obtain ... appropriate equitable relief ... to redress [ERISA] violations 
or ... to enforce any provisions of [ERISA].‟”  Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
Inc., 539 F.3d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3)).  “A beneficiary can make out a claim for appropriate equitable relief based 
on a theory of equitable estoppel.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
But “[t]o succeed under this theory of relief, an ERISA plaintiff must establish (1) a 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(e), (f).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review de novo 
district court orders granting or denying summary judgment,” Elassaad v. Independence 
Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 2010), “apply[ing] the same test required of the 
district court and view[ing] inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 
577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is proper when “the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We “may affirm the district court on 
grounds different from those relied on by the district court,” In re Mushroom Transp. Co. 
Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 344 (3d Cir. 2004), and “for any reason supported by the record,” 
Brightwell v. Lehman 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
 8 
 
material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the 
representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances.”  Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 1994).  Moreover, the Employees “bear the burden of 
proof on each estoppel element.”  Int’l Union, U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 
130, 152 (3d Cir. 1999).     
Because we conclude that the Employees have not met their burden with respect to 
either reasonable reliance or extraordinary circumstances, we confine our discussion to 
those two requirements. 
 A. Reasonable Reliance 
To prevail on their equitable estoppel claim, “[a]s the phrase „reasonable and 
detrimental reliance‟ implies, ... [the Employees] must show (1) reasonableness and (2) 
injury.”  Pell, 539 F.3d at 301 (quoting Curcio, 33 F.3d at 237).   The District Court did 
not address the reasonableness of the Employees‟ alleged reliance, and concluded only 
that the evidence supports an inference that at least some of them “relied to their 
detriment on [ALICO]‟s misrepresentation regarding pension benefits.”  (App. at 31.)  
The Employees likewise focus on the element of injury, arguing that some of them would 
not have accepted ALICO‟s April 2004 offers of employment if they had known that they 
would not be enrolled in a defined benefit pension plan.  The only evidence that the 
Employees point to in support of the reasonableness of their alleged reliance is the Q&A 
and General Overview which had been provided to them. 
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We conclude that that evidence is insufficient to meet the Employees‟ burden on 
the element of reasonable reliance.  Based on all of the documents that the Employees 
received, this case is analogous to situations in which participants know that the plan 
sponsor reserves the right to alter or eliminate benefits at any time.  Even if one thought 
that the Q&A‟s statement about eligibility for a pension plan meant that there was a 
defined benefit plan, as opposed to a 401(k) plan, there were several subsequent 
communications making it clear that no defined benefit plan participation was offered 
until 2010.  We have said that “a participant‟s reliance on employer representations 
regarding benefits may never be „reasonable‟ where the participant is in possession of a 
written document notifying him of the conditional nature of such benefits.”  In re Unisys 
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 908 (3d Cir. 1995).  And in such 
cases, we and other courts of appeals have rejected estoppel claims due to the 
participants‟ failure to establish reasonable reliance.  See id. (concluding that the 
reservation of rights “undercuts the reasonableness of any detrimental reliance” by the 
plan participants); Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999 F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that ERISA plaintiffs “have not shown that they reasonably and 
detrimentally relied on any statements by the company” where they “knew or should 
have known from the express terms of the ... Plan that benefits could be altered at any 
time”); Alday v. Container Corp. of Am., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing 
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an equitable estoppel claim where the plan documents unambiguously stated that the 
employer reserved the right to modify or terminate the plan). 
In this case, the Employees were in possession of documents that informed them 
not only that ALICO might not include them in its defined benefit pension plan, but that, 
in fact, it had not done so.  First, before they received the Q&A, the letters from ULLICO 
regarding its decision to outsource PSC services notified them that ALICO‟s “offer of 
employment likely will include permanent changes in the salary, benefits, and other terms 
and conditions of employment that you have experienced with ULLICO.”  (App. at 537.)  
Second, the General Overview, which was the only benefits summary referred to in the 
letters offering employment to the Employees, referred only to a 401(k) savings plan and 
did not mention a defined benefit pension plan.  Third, neither the 2004 CBA nor the 
2007 CBA, copies of which were distributed to the Employees, provided for a defined 
benefit plan.  Cf. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pitt. Plate 
Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971) (“Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, ... mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include pension and insurance 
benefits for active employees ... .”).  Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that, when 
ALICO offered future participation in a defined benefit pension plan as part of the 
negotiation of the 2010 MOU, any of the Employees expressed either surprise or dismay 
that they were not already vested participants in it.
2
  We question whether the Employees 
                                              
2
 In fact, the PSC employees bargained to defer their accrual of benefits under the 
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could establish any reliance, let alone reasonable reliance, on references in the General 
Overview and Q&A to potential pension benefits in deciding to accept or continue 
employment at ALICO.  But, assuming they did rely on those documents, that reliance 
was not reasonable in light of subsequent communications. 
 B. Extraordinary Circumstances 
Even if the Employees had established reasonable reliance, “a plaintiff must do 
more than merely make out the ordinary elements of equitable estoppel to establish a 
claim ... under ERISA.”  Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1553 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “Our precedents indicate that an ERISA reporting or 
disclosure violation, such as the distribution of an inaccurate summary plan description, 
cannot provide a basis for equitable estoppel ... in the absence of „extraordinary 
circumstances.‟”  Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 
1991).
3
  “Extraordinary circumstances can arise where there are „affirmative acts of 
fraud,‟ where there is a „network of misrepresentations ... over an extended course of 
dealing,‟ or where particular plaintiffs are especially vulnerable.”  Pell, 539 F.3d at 303-
04 (alterations in original) (quoting Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1553).  We have found extraordinary 
                                                                                                                                                  
ALICO defined benefit plan by another two years in return for additional compensation. 
3
 The “extraordinary circumstances” requirement comes from the fact that “ERISA 
contains two express causes of action to remedy reporting and disclosure violations as 
such,” Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1167 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4), (c)), so those violations cannot ordinarily serve as the basis for 
substantive relief. 
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circumstances when an insurer informed a patient that certain coverage would be 
provided and then denied coverage, Curcio, 33 F.3d at 238, when a defendant repeatedly 
misrepresented the scope of coverage to a plan participant, Smith v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 6 
F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 1993), and when an employer failed to make required 
contributions and the plan administrator allowed an employee to pay contributions 
himself, Rosen v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
Applying those principles, we find no support for the Employees‟ claim that 
extraordinary circumstances exist.  Far from being the victims of a “network of 
misrepresentations,” the Employees were plainly put on notice by the General Overview, 
the 2004 CBA, the 2007 CBA, and the 2010 MOU that they had not been granted 
participation in any ALICO defined benefit pension plan prior to 2010.  The only 
conceivably confusing document was the Q&A that ALICO distributed, which, even if 
read to offer the possibility that pension benefits would include a defined benefit plan, 
was qualified by the more complete General Overview referred to in the offers of 
employment sent to the Employees.  Nothing in the record suggests that the Employees – 
represented as they were by the ITPEU, and capable of trading pension benefits for 
additional compensation when given the chance – were especially vulnerable to the 
alleged misrepresentations in the Q&A.  Cf. Curcio, 33 F.3d at 238 (finding special 
vulnerability where hospital denied coverage to patient for substantial claim after 
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representing that there was coverage); Smith, 6 F.3d at 142 (same).  The Employees have 
thus failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, and their equitable estoppel claim 
under ERISA must fail. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
